A Senate report has revealed that the lead Secret Service agent overseeing Donald Trump’s rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13, 2024, was informed of a “credible intelligence” threat against the former president but failed to notify her supervisors or the security planning team. 

This detail emerged in a 94-page report on the assassination attempt, published by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The report highlighted that, despite the warning, the agent wrote in a security planning document that there was “no adverse intelligence” concerning Trump’s visit to Butler. 

The agent later told Senate investigators that she had notified the special agent in charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh field office about the threat. However, the SAIC denied receiving any such communication. He told investigators that had he been aware, the rally, which took place at the Butler Farm Show Grounds, could have been moved indoors for added security.

Despite the serious findings, the lead agent, along with 11 other Secret Service personnel interviewed, refused to accept responsibility for the multiple security lapses identified in the report.

The security failures had devastating consequences. The assassination attempt resulted in the death of 50-year-old rally goer Corey Comperatore, critical injuries to two other attendees, and Trump himself being shot in the ear. The assailant, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, opened fire from the rooftop of the American Glass Research building before being shot and killed by a Secret Service counter-sniper.

Investigators found that the deployment of Secret Service counter-snipers to the rally was in direct response to the threat intelligence. This marked the first time a counter-sniper team was assigned to an event for someone other than the president, vice president, or an official presidential candidate—Trump was the presumptive GOP nominee at the time.

The Senate report notes that the decision to assign counter-snipers was made before July 5, 2024, based on several factors, including the size of Trump’s outdoor events, his standing as the likely Republican nominee, and classified threat information. The report also emphasized that only two Secret Service personnel interviewed by the committee were aware of the credible threat prior to the rally, with only one being privy to the classified intelligence.

 

The FBI confirmed that Crooks had not been known to them prior to the assassination attempt. Despite the warning, the lead agent, who received a call on July 9 about the threat, wrote in her preliminary survey for the rally that “no adverse intelligence” had been developed. 

When questioned about this inconsistency, the agent explained that while she had informed the Pittsburgh SAIC about the counter-snipers, she believed there was no broader intelligence to pass along to the rest of the team. The Pittsburgh SAIC disputed this, stating that his first knowledge of the counter-snipers came through an email requesting housing for them.

The Senate report ultimately concluded that the assassination attempt was “foreseeable” and “preventable.” It attributed the incident to a series of failures in planning, communication, and resource allocation within the Secret Service. These failures also included a lack of effective coordination with local law enforcement and problems with communication equipment.

The committee discovered further issues, such as “siloed communications” and inadequate response to Crooks’ suspicious behavior before the shooting. At least eight Secret Service agents had reportedly noticed Crooks acting suspiciously with a rangefinder nearly 30 minutes before the attack. Additionally, the investigation was hindered by heavily redacted documents, which delayed interviews and obstructed the committee’s ability to conduct an efficient investigation.

The report emphasized that these redactions limited the committee’s ability to propose necessary reforms to prevent future incidents.